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COMMENTS
PAY FOR PLAY: SHOULD SCHOLARSHIP ATHLETES
BE INCLUDED WITHIN STATE WORKER'S
COMPENSATION SYSTEMS?
I. INTRODUCTION
"[Tihe cost of the product should bear the blood of the workman."'
This theory, which underlies all worker's compensation law, posits that
injuries to employees, like the breakage of machinery, should be part of
the cost of production by employers.2 The theory is applicable to college
sports, where the business is college athletics and the employees are the
athletes. As one critic has stated, "Amateur athletics at the major col-
lege level is big business." 3 The rules of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCAA") support the popular belief that college sports are
only part of an overall educational experience,4 but in reality, sports at
major universities are big business.5 In fact, collegiate sports have be-
come so much of a business enterprise that they now need the benefits of
a worker's compensation program. The policies and structures behind
worker's compensation systems 6 suggest that scholarship athletes should
be included in the protections of that system.
1. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS § 80, at
573 (5th ed. 1984).
2. Id
3. Lee Goldman, Sports and AntitrusL" Should College Students Be Paid to Play? 65 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 206 (1990). Some argue that the NCAA is operating a cartel for the
purpose of restraining competition among its member institutions; thus, the result is to depress
compensation to student athletes. Proponents of this view assert that the athletes are treated
as "slave laborers" who are exploited for the purpose of expanding university coffers. The
argument concludes that the athletes should be paid for providing their services to the univer-
sities, with their compensation determined according to market forces. Further, proponents
suggest that this would result in a more just allocation of resources and would eliminate much
of the hypocrisy which exists in major college sports. Id. at 216-17.
4. Generally, the NCAA is designed to maintain the educational focus of college sports.
The competitive athletics programs of member institutions are designed to be a vital
part of the educational system. A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete
as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demar-
cation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.
NCAA CONST. art. I § 1.3.1.
5. See infra notes 130-46 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 7-32 and accompanying text.
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This comment addresses the relationship between student athletes
and their universities, and it discusses the obligations and duties that flow
from this relationship. Specifically, this comment analyzes state judicial
and legislative reactions to compensation claims brought by student ath-
letes who were injured while playing under athletic scholarships at their
universities. After examining generally the worker's compensation sys-
tem and its possible applicability to college athletes, this comment evalu-
ates the statutory efforts and case law that have allowed universities to
avoid liability for injuries in most cases. Finally, this comment considers
what should be done, and what is being attempted, to correct the inequi-
ties in the current situation.
II. WORKER'S COMPENSATION SYSTEMS IN GENERAL
Every American jurisdiction provides for some type of worker's
compensation scheme.' The worker's compensation system developed as
a reaction both to the harsh working conditions imposed upon most
workers and to the slow progress of the common law to mandate im-
provements.' Liability under worker's compensation law is not based in
tort, but rather upon a concept of "social insurance."9 Liability is im-
posed on an employer because protection of workers is considered good
for society. An employer's negligence is not the determinative factor. 10
Worker's compensation laws are intended to achieve several goals
by providing previously determined amounts of compensation to injured
employees. The primary goal is to insure that an injured employee, and
those who depend on him- for support, will be adequately provided for
while the employee is unable to work.II At the same time, the law aims
to insure that the injured employee will receive sufficient medical care to
facilitate a rapid recovery.' 2 The system also seeks to provide monetary
compensation for any permanent disability that may result from the in-
jury. 3 Where it is likely that the injured employee will be unable to
resume his prior occupation, compensation is awarded in order to reha-
bilitate or retrain that employee.' 4 In the event that the employee dies as
7. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 1987 ANALYSIS OF WORKERS COMPENSATION LAWS
vii (1987); KEETON et al., supra note 1, at 573.
8. See KEETON et al., supra note 1, at 568-71.
9. Id. at 568.
10. Id at 573.






a result of his injuries, the system provides dependents with compensa-
tion. 5 In other words,
[t]he purpose of the award is not to make the employee whole
for the loss which he has suffered but to prevent him and his
dependents from becoming public charges during the period of
his disability.... In short the award transfers a portion of the
loss suffered by the disabled employee from him and his depen-
dents to the consuming public. 6
In most states, the right to worker's compensation benefits is en-
tirely statutory' and is not derived from common law."8 Further, one
court has held that "[r]ights, remedies and obligations rest on the status
of the employer-employee relationship, rather than on contract or
tort.""'9 When a person is injured on the job, he is entitled to compensa-
tion under the worker's compensation scheme that has been codified by
state law. This entitlement arises as a consequence of the statutory em-
ployer-employee relationship, not out of any act or omission of the em-
ployer.2 ° The injured employee is "compensate[d] for losses... to which
the fact of employment in the industry exposes the employee."'2 1 Gener-
ally, worker's compensation schemes make the employer strictly liable
for an employee injury occurring within the scope of employment.22
Negligence and, for the most part, fault are not at issue and cannot affect
the result. In exchange for the guaranteed, although limited, financial
recovery, the employee typically gives up his right to sue for damages.
23
There are two purposes behind imposition of strict liability: (1) pro-
vision of quick and certain recovery; and (2) avoidance of an adversarial
situation that may strain future employer-employee relations.24 The the-
ory behind imposition of strict liability is that the enterprise ought to
bear the employee's loss rather than permit it to lie on the unfortunate
employee who unluckily incurred the injury.25 One expert explained, "In
the evolution of workmen's compensation legislation and case law there
15. Id.
16. O'BRIEN, supra note 11, at 5 (quoting Minnie West v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 12
Cal. Comp. Cases 86 (1947)).
17. Johnson v. W.C.A.B., 471 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 1970).
18. Carrigan v. California State Legis., 263 F.2d 560, 567 (9th Cir. 1959).
19. Graczyk v. W.C.A.B., 229 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (1986).
20. Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 637 P.2d 266, 272 (Cal. 1981).
21. Id.
22. KEETON et a]., supra note 1, at 573.
23. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(a) (Deering 1991); O'BRIEN, supra note 11, at 5; see also Van
Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1963).
24. O'BRIEN, supra note 11, at 5.
25. See KEETON et al., supra note 1, at 573.
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has been an increasing recognition of its purpose to distribute the risk of
service-connected injuries . . . by charging all enterprises with [these]
costs ... ."26 The employer is usually better able to bear the cost of the
injury because he or she is in a position to pass the added cost along to
the consumer in the price of goods or services sold.27 Because the em-
ployer is held strictly liable, the recovery is generally less than an award
of damages recoverable under the common law.2" An injury to an em-
ployee is like the breakage of a piece of business equipment, and the em-
ployer is required to pay the cost of repair. 9
The ability of employers to better bear the cost of injuries has led to
liberal construction of the worker's compensation laws in favor of award-
ing compensation to employees.3 0 The courts include as many claims as
are reasonably possible under the laws "in order to give meaning to the
act's humane purposes and remedial character."31 Because the existence
of an employer-employee relationship is critical to the application of the
worker's compensation laws, much litigation focuses on the definition of
eligible "employees." Additionally, because the right to receive benefits
is wholly statutory, a legislature has "broad power and wide discretion"
in defining eligible employees in such a way as to achieve the remedial
policies of the act.32  To obtain employee status under most statutory
schemes, the injured party must show that he or she was working for the
other party and that a contract for employment existed between them.
A. The Employment Contract
Traditionally, an employment contract includes three elements:
"(1) consent of the parties, (2) consideration for the services rendered,
and (3) control by the employer over the employee."13 3 Thus, the parties
must have a consensual employment relationship. Also, the parties must
26. Laeng v. W.C.A.B., 494 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972) (quoting Van Horn. 33 Cal. Rptr. at
174).
27. KEETON et al., supra note 1, at 573.
28. Id. at 574; see also Van Horn, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
29. KEETON et al., supra note 1, at 573; Ray Yasser, Are Scholarship Athletes at Big-Time
Programs Really University Employees?-You Bet They Arel, 9 BLACK L.J. 65, 66 (1984).
30. See Laeng v. W.C.A.B., 494 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1972); Van Horn v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1963); Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444
N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (Ind. 1983); University of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 426 (Colo.
1953); Barragan v. W.C.A.B., 240 Cal. Rptr. 811, 816 (1987).
31. Yasser, supra note 29, at 66.
32. Graczyk v. W.C.A.B., 229 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 n.2 (1986).
33. Parsons v. W.C.A.B., 179 Cal. Rptr. 88, 94 (1981) (citing 2 HANNA, CALIFORNIA
LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 30.2 (2d ed. 1981).
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mutually agree that an employer-employee relationship is created.34 This
requirement of a contract recognizes that the employment relationship is
a mutual arrangement between the parties in which both parties agree to
give up something in exchange for something else. 3 5 The parties' inten-
tions and mutual assents should be determined by evaluating the express
agreements between the parties as well as the reasonable inferences
drawn from their actions.36 In other words, "mutual assent to contract is
not ascertained by considering the internal actions or subjective motives
of a party."
37
While the traditional contract for hire involves an exchange of serv-
ices for monetary compensation, "direct compensation in the form of
wages is not necessary to establish the relationship so long as the service
is not gratuitous."'3 Gratuitous service has been found where the serv-
ices were rendered by a "mere volunteer" who was providing the services
as a gift to the beneficiaries. 39 The term "employed" is not confined to
business employment but may also include more informal relationships. 4'
The definition of employee is substantially the same in most jurisdic-
tions.4 Generally, there must be some agreement, express or implied, in
which one party agrees to exchange services for some other thing of
34. See Barragan v. W.C.A.B., 240 Cal. Rptr. 811, 815 (1986); Rensing v. Indiana State
Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (Ind. 1983).
35. Barragan, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
36. Id
37. Id at 817.
38. Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172 (1963). See also
Union Lumber Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 55 P.2d 911 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936);
Gabel v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 256 P.2d 564 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
39. O'BRIEN, supra note 11, at 23.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. b (1957).
41. See ALA. CODE § 25-5-1(6) (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265(12) (1991); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-901(5) (1991); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(2) (Michie 1991); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 8-40-202()(b) (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-275(5) (1990); DEL. CODE
ANN. fit. 19, § 2301 (1990); FLA. STAT. ch. 440.02(13)(a) (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-1(2)
(Michie 1991); HAw. REV. STAT § 386-1 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 72-102(10) (1991); IND.
CODE § 22-3-6-1(b) (Burns 1990); IOWA CODE § 85.61(11) (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-
508 (1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.640(l) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 23:971(1)-(3) (West 1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 1(4) (Law. Co-op.
1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.161(1)(b) (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-118(1)(a)
(1991); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-115(1) (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-16-(A) (Michie 1991);
N.Y. WORKER'S CoMP. LAW § 355.2(a) (Consol. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-2(2) (1991);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01(A)(1)(a)-(b) (Baldwin 1991); OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 3(4)
(1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 28-29-2(2) (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-130 (Law. Co-op.
1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-1-3 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-43(1)(b) (1991);
VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-l01(A)(1) (Michie 1991); W. VA. CODE § 23-2-la(a) (1991); WYO.
STAT. § 27-14-102 (1991).
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value.4 2 In California, an "employee" is defined as "every person in the
service of an employer under an appointment or contract of hire or ap-
prenticeship, express or implied, oral or written. '43 Additionally, Cali-
fornia adopts a rebuttable presumption, under which "[a]ny person
rendering service for another, ... unless expressly excluded herein, is
presumed to be an employee."'  An "employer" is generally defined as
any party "using the services of another for pay." '4 5
B. Judicial Construction of "Employee" in California
California courts have construed the worker's compensation laws
broadly.' Academic credit or other educational benefits given in ex-
change for services rendered have been found to constitute sufficient
compensation to establish the necessary relationship of hire.4 7 Participa-
tion on the sports team of a profit-making enterprise in exchange for non-
monetary consideration has also resulted in a finding that the participant
is an employee.4" Generally, any consideration given in exchange for
services may create the necessary employer-employee relationship.
Non-monetary compensation was held to be sufficient to create an
employment relationship in Gabel v. Industrial Accident Commission.4 9
In that case, the parties orally agreed to exchange farm operation services
of equal value. Afterward, one of the parties was injured while helping
the other combat a brush fire.5 0 The court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that there was no employment relationship between the two parties
because the plaintiff was providing his services voluntarily."' Instead, the
court agreed with the plaintiff that the services he provided were not
gratuitous.5 2 The court held that "pecuniary consideration for services
is not necessary," and that a party "may compensate for services by




43. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351 (Deering 1991); see also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 810.2 (Deering
1991).
44. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3357 (Deering 1991).
45. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-6-1(a) (Bums 1990); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 3300 (Deer-
ing 1991).
46. See infra notes 47-67.
47. Barragan, 240 Cal. Rptr. 811; Union Lumber 55 P.2d 911.
48. Krueger v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 873 F.2d 222, 224 n.4 (9th Cir. 1989).
49. 256 P.2d 564 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 565-66.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 565.
SPOR IN LAW
In some circumstances, a promise of possible employment may be
sufficient consideration to create a contract. For example, courts have
found compensation where a potential employee participates in an em-
ployment application process under the employer's control. In Laeng v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board, 54 Laeng was injured during an
agility test that was part of an application for a job with the city. 5 Even
though the city was not providing any cash payment or other compensa-
tion to Laeng, the California Supreme Court concluded that he was enti-
fled to worker's compensation benefits. The court found that "California
workmen's compensation law does not require that an applicant be re-
ceiving actual 'compensation' for his 'services' in order to fall within the
workmen's compensation scheme."5 6 There, the court focused on the
language of the definition of "employee" and noted that, by the use of the
disjunctive, a "contract for hire" was not required for compensation. 7
Participation in school-approved work-study programs has been
found to be sufficient to turn students into employees when their only
compensation is academic credits. In Union Lumber Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission,"8 a high school student was injured while working
in a butcher shop for academic credits.5 9 He was participating in a pro-
gram in which the school and the butcher shop cooperated to provide
students an opportunity to practice their vocations.' The California
court held that the "consideration for the agreement of employment may
be represented by money paid for services or it may consist of valuable
instructions rendered to qualify the pupil as a skilled artisan or trades-
man.""' Another California court concluded similarly in the more re-
cent decision of Barragan v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board. 6 2 In
that case, the court found that a student extern assisting in physical ther-
apy at a hospital as part of the necessary training for a degree in physical
therapy was an employee of that hospital.63 The court reached this con-
clusion despite the fact that the student received neither monetary com-
pensation nor an offer of future employment in exchange for her
54. 494 P.2d I (Cal. 1972).
55. Id at 2.
56. Id. at 4 n.5.
57. Id; Labor Code section 3351 defines "employee" as "every person in the service of an
employer under an appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral
or written .... " (emphasis added) CAL. LAB. CODE § 3351 (Deering 1991).
58. 55 P.2d 911 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
59. Id at 912.
60. Id
61. Id at 914.
62. 240 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1987).
63. Id.
1992]
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services.64
In Krueger v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, Inc. 5 ("Krueger"), the
court found that participation on a sports team in return for non-mone-
tary consideration was sufficient to create an employment relationship.
The court in Krueger held that a jury could find the necessary employer-
employee relationship to exist where a ski team member agreed to repre-
sent a corporation in exchange for use of the corporation's skiing facili-
ties and the services of its ski coaches. 6 The court noted that while the
team member did not collect a paycheck for his services rendered to the
corporation, he received benefits and was thus "paid" for representing
it.67 In holding that sponsored team members may be found to be em-
ployed by a corporation, the court distinguished the corporations from
educational institutions, stating that a corporation derives an economic
benefit from sponsorship of the team.
68
Finally, courts have simply rejected any requirement that there be a
monetary exchange before an employment relationship can be said to ex-
ist. Instead, courts have consistently found the necessary relationship to
exist where an individual provides some service as part of even the most
unconventional exchange. This approach was followed in Morales v.
Worker's Compensation Appeals Board,69 where the court held that a
prisoner's release from confinement in order to perform community work
was sufficient compensation to find the prisoner an employee of the
county.7" The release from confinement was found to be compensation
within the meaning of the worker's compensation laws.7"
The California cases clearly exhibit a broad application of the
worker's compensation laws. Almost any exchange may be found to
constitute adequate consideration, as long as the injured person was ren-
dering a service under another person's direction, assignment, and con-
trol.7" If the service was not rendered purely gratuitously, an
employment relationship can be found. Such a broad application is nec-
essary to give effect to the worker's compensation system's "humane pur-
poses and remedial character."73 Under this policy, the individual who
64. Id. at 816.
65. 873 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1989).
66. Id. at 224.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 224 n.4.
69. 230 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1986).
70. Id. at 579, 580.
71. Id.
72. Laeng v. W.C.A.B., 494 P.2d I (Cal. 1972).
73. Yasser, supra note 29, at 66; see also supra notes 11-16, 30-32 and accompanying text.
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makes a gratuitous offer of services may be fairly excluded because no
exchange occurs between the parties. Because of the statutory mandate
of "liberal construction" of the worker's compensation laws, courts
should endeavor to find an exchange between the parties.
III. HISTORICAL APPROACHES TO THE AWARD OF EMPLOYEE
STATUS TO ATHLETES
A scholarship agreement has been held to be a contract, at least in
situations not involving worker's compensation claims. In Taylor v.
Wake Forest University 4 ("Taylor"), the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals found a breach of contract by a scholarship student athlete who
failed to participate on the football team for the last two years of his
study as required by his agreement. 75 The District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee reached a similar result in Begley v. Corporation of
Mercer University 76 ("Begley'", where the court held that the university's
repudiation of a scholarship was valid because the student had failed to
meet the minimum entrance requirements.77 The Begley court reached
that result because it found the student athlete had failed to comply with
a condition subsequent to the contract. 78 Both the Taylor and Begley
courts expressly found that it was the intent of the parties to enter into a
binding contract 79 and that the schools each intended to extend mone-
tary aid in exchange for the athlete's participation on a sports team at the
university. 0
Neither court, however, discussed whether the subject contracts es-
tablished the necessary employer-employee relationship. Taylor's appli-
cation for his grant-in-aid specified that it was "awarded for academic
and athletic achievement and [was] not to be interpreted as employment
in any manner."8" While it is unclear whether a party's unilateral char-
acterization of the relationship is controlling, an express statement may
be indicative of the understanding between the parties.
8 2
Several court decisions have held that a scholarship contract be-
74. 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
75. It is possible that the scholarship could have been viewed as as an academic grant,
representing a gift from the university. In that case there would be little argument that it
created an employment relationship for worker's compensation purposes. JOHN C. WEISTART
& CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPoRTs 6-20 (1979).
76. 367 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
77. Id
78. Id at 910.
79. Id. at 909-10; Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 381.
80. Begley. 367 F. Supp. at 909-10; Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 382.
81. Taylor, 191 S.E.2d at 380.
82. "Practical construction of instruments by the parties to them should, in case of doubt
1992]
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tween a student and a university can establish the necessary employer-
employee relationship.8 3 The decision in University of Denver v. Ne-
meth 14 ("Nemeth)'9 was the first case to find a scholarship student athlete
to be an employee of a university. In Nemeth, the Colorado Supreme
Court found an athlete eligible for worker's compensation benefits for
injuries sustained during football practice.8 Nemeth, the athlete, was
receiving fifty dollars per month from the university for performing
maintenance on the campus tennis courts and surrounding areas.8 6 Ad-
ditionally, the university provided him with housing on campus in ex-
change for cleaning the sidewalks and caring for the furnace on the
premises."' The court rejected the university's argument that Nemeth
was a maintenance worker who also played football, finding that Ne-
meth's employment in the maintenance positions was dependent upon his
continued participation on the university football team.8 8 In other
words, the court found that Nemeth received his salary in exchange for
playing football at the university as well as for doing the maintenance
work.8 9
The Colorado Supreme Court narrowed its decision in Nemeth a few
years later in State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commis-
sion of Colorado. 90 In that case, the supreme court denied death benefits
to the widow of a student athlete who died of head injuries sustained in a
football game.9 ' Noting that the student was employed part-time at the
campus student lounge, the court found that this employment was not
conditioned upon his continued participation on the football team.92 The
supreme court distinguished Nemeth by stating:
[Nemeth's] employment as a student worker depended wholly
on his playing football, and it is clear that if he failed to per-
form as a football player he would lose the job provided for him
by the University.... Thus a contractual relationship was cre-
as to the meaning of the words used, control the intention of the parties and the meaning of
their language." Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611, 612 (1915).
83. University of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953); State Compensation Ins.
Fund v. Industrial Comm'n of Colo., 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957); Van Horn v. Industrial Acci-
dent Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963).
84. 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 424.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 427, 430.
89. Nemeth, 257 P.2d at 427, 430.
90. 314 P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957).
91. Id at 289.
92. Id at 289-90.
SPORTS LAW
ated between the claimant and the University.93
From these two decisions, it is apparent that, at least in Colorado,
simple participation on a sports team does not create the employer-em-
ployee relationship required to receive the protection of the worker's
compensation system. Rather, it appears necessary that the student re-
ceive some form of financial benefit from the university, conditioned
upon the athlete's performance on a university sports team. Such a con-
struction is contrary to the California cases which find employment rela-
tionships based on non-traditional forms of compensation. 94  The
Colorado Supreme Court's construction, however, is consistent with a
finding of employee status where the athlete receives an athletic scholar-
ship based solely on his participation on a sports team.
California first grappled with the question of whether scholarship
athletes are employees of their universities in Van Horn v. Industrial Ac-
cident Commission 9 ("Van Horn"). In that case, the court found that
Van Horn was an employee of California State Polytechnic College based
solely on the existence of the scholarship contract, without a requirement
of non-athletic service to the school.96 Van Horn was killed in an air-
plane crash during a return flight with other members and coaches of the
football team following an away game.97 As an athlete, he was receiving
funds identified as an "athletic scholarship" in an amount equal to the
approximate costs of tuition, books, and living expenses.98 The court
recognized that the scholarship was conditioned upon academic eligibil-
ity but found that the compensation was extended primarily because of
athletic ability and participation.99 In the court's words, "The only infer-
ence to be drawn from the evidence is that decedent received the 'schol-
arship' because of his athletic prowess and participation. '" 10 The court
also suggested that an employee relationship may be found where an ath-
lete does not receive a scholarship, but upon a showing that the services
of the athlete were not given gratuitously. The court concluded, "The
form of remuneration is immaterial. A court will look through form to
93. Id at 290.
94. See Barragan v. W.C.A.B., 240 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1987); Union Lumber v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 55 P.2d 911 (Cal. 1936); Gabel v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 256 P. 564
(Cal. 1927); Laeng v. W.C.A.B., 494 P.2d I (Cal. 1972); Morales v. W.C.A.B., 230 Cal. Rptr.
575 (1986).
95. Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963).
96. Id at 174.
97. Id at 170.
98. Id. at 171.
99. Id at 174.
100. Van Horn, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
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determine whether consideration has been paid for services."' 0'
A. Legislative Response to Award of Employee Status
Apparently in response to the Van Horn decision, the California
Legislature in 1965 amended its codified list of persons excluded from its
statutory definition of employee. The legislature added to its list of ex-
clusions in the Labor Code "[any] person, other than a regular employee,
participating in sports or athletics who receives no compensation for
such participation other than the use of athletic equipment, uniforms,
transportation, travel, meals, lodgings, or other expenses incidental
thereto."' 2 In 1981, the Labor Code was again amended to further
exclude:
[a]ny student participating as an athlete in amateur sporting
events sponsored by any public agency, public or private non-
profit college, university or school, who receives no remunera-
tion for the participation other than the use of athletic
equipment, uniforms, transportation, travel, meals, lodgings,
scholarships, grants-in-aid, or other expenses incidental
thereto. 103
While the amendment appeared to expand the list of exclusions, the legis-
lative history suggests that the legislature intended the further amend-
ment-Labor Code section 3352(k)-to merely clarify existing law, not
substantively change the law.) °c
Despite its legislative history, Labor Code section 3352(k) operates
to preclude student athletes who participate on university athletic teams
from claiming benefits under the worker's compensation system. In
Graczyk v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Board, Io section 3352(k) was
applied retroactively to a scholarship athlete who was injured while play-
ing in a football game." 6 The court interpreted section 3352(k) to ex-
clude Graczyk, who was playing football for the university pursuant to
an athletic scholarship, from the definition of an employee entitled to
worker's compensation benefits.' 7 Because Graczyk was found not to be
an employee of the university, he was denied any benefits under the
worker's compensation system.
101. Id
102. For former CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(j), see Graczyk v. W.C.A.B., 229 Cal. Rptr. 494,
499 (1986).
103. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(k) (Deering 1991).
104. Graczyk 229 Cal. Rptr. at 500 n.4.
105. Id at 494.
106. Id
107. Id at 501.
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B. Recent Judicial Responses to Claims of Employee Status
In Indiana, the exclusion of student athletes from employee status
was accomplished by judicial construction. The Indiana Supreme Court
found that scholarship athletes did not come within the definition of
"employee" under its worker's compensation scheme in 1983.10s In
Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees"°9 ("Rensing"), for
example, the Indiana Supreme Court held that a scholarship agreement
was not a contract for employment.110 The court found that the parties
had not intended to enter into an employer-employee relationship at the
time of their agreement."' Additionally, the evidence showed that the
parties had not considered the scholarship to constitute "pay." 12 Fur-
ther, an important right of an employer was missing because the agree-
ment failed to provide the university with the right to withdraw the
scholarship in the event of poor performance by the athlete."13 Because
these three elements were lacking in the scholarship agreement, the court
concluded that the necessary employer-employee relationship did not
exist. 114
In Michigan that same year, a state appellate court reached a similar
conclusion. The court in Coleman v. Western Michigan UniversityI"
("Coleman") found that the recipient of an annual, renewable football
scholarship was not an employee of the university when he was injured in
football practice." 6 The Coleman court applied an "economic reality"
test to determine whether an employment relationship existed."17 Under
this test, the court considered four factors to determine whether an em-
ployment relationship existed:
(1) the proposed employer's right to control or dictate the ac-
tivities of the proposed employee; (2) the proposed employer's
right to discipline or fire the proposed employee; (3) the pay-
ment of "wages" and, particularly, the extent to which the pro-
posed employee is dependent upon the payment of wages or
other benefits for his daily living expenses; and (4) whether the
task performed by the proposed employee was "an integral
108. Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983).
109. Id
110. Id at 1175.
111. Id at 1173.
112. Id
113. Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1174.
114. Id at 1175.
115. 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
116. Id. at 228.
117. Id at 225.
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part" of the proposed employer's business.... None of the
foregoing factors is by itself dispositive. Each factor must be
considered in turn, and all of them then taken into account in
determining the existence of an employment relationship."1 8
Using its economic reality test, the Coleman court decided that the
employer's rights to control and to discipline were limited because Cole-
man's annual scholarship was irrevocable, regardless of the athlete's per-
formance, once it was awarded at the beginning of the year." 9 Second,
the control exerted by the university was no more than that exerted over
any other student at the university.120 The court conceded that under
the third prong the scholarship constituted "wages" within the meaning
of an employment relationship.' 2 ' The court determined, however, that
the task performed by Coleman was not integral to the university's busi-
ness.'2 2 Although three of the four elements of an employment relation-
ship under the economic reality test were present at least to a limited
extent, the court concluded that the necessary relationship for worker's
compensation eligibility did not exist because the failure of the fourth
factor "weighed heavily against" finding the existence of such a
relationship. 1
23
IV. SOME SYSTEM IS NECESSARY TO PROTECT ATHLETES
The problem is seen most easily in the context of college football.
Football is an inherently dangerous game, and a player runs the risk of
suffering a serious injury or even death. 24 Therefore, football players
use highly specialized equipment, and the rules of the game have been
adapted to minimize the potential for injury. In spite of the efforts made
to minimize injuries, however, they are considered to be a part of the
game. While it is difficult to gather statistics regarding the frequency and
types of injuries that occur in college football, a report from the National
118. Id at 225-26.
119. IM at 226.
120. Coleman, 336 N.W.2d at 226.
121. Id.
122. Id at 226-27.
123. Id at 227.
124. One example of the potential for serious injury in football involved Darryl Stingley, a
professional wide-receiver for the New England Patriots in 1978. Stingley was hit in the head
while attempting to catch a pass. The tackle forced Stingley's neck to snap back, leaving him a
quadriplegic. Mike Freeman, There's No Guarding Against Injuries, L.A. TIMES, June 30,
1991, at Cl. In 1989, fifteen football players died from injuries. Additionally, fourteen spinal
cord injuries occurred during football-related activities causing permanent paralysis. Para-
lyzing Football Injuries Reach 13-Year High in 1989, UNITED PRESS INT'L, July 16, 1990,
newswire.
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Football League ("NFL") suggests that injuries are commonplace. 25
The report found that each team suffered almost sixty injuries during the
course of the season.' 26 Of those injuries, more than one-third were
fairly severe injuries with potentially long-lasting, career-threatening ef-
fects. 12  One NFL player agent stated that injuries are so common that
the likelihood of any player being drafted by the military is low because
few could pass an induction physical.'
28
A player faces several problems if he or she is injured in college,
especially if the injury is severe. Initially, the player often needs immedi-
ate medical care. For most college students, the high cost of medicine
may put the necessary care out of reach. Second, recovery from many
football injuries is slow, so the athlete may need extended physical ther-
apy. This type of care can also be expensive. Finally, the athlete may be
permanently disabled, and this will affect the athlete's future earning ca-
pacity. Continuing disability is not unusual, with the most common
types of injuries involving the knee, the spine, and the shoulder."2 9 This
raises the difficult question: who should pay for the athlete's medical
care and rehabilitation-the student or the university?
The simple answer would be to require the athlete to maintain his
own personal medical insurance. That approach can be attacked for two
reasons: (1) often college athletes are from families who cannot afford
the cost of medical insurance, so this would result in many athletes being
uninsured; and (2) universities are receiving significant financial benefits
from the athletes' participation in sports, so the schools should bear the
cost of injuries. Because college sports are big business, the question of
who should bear the risk of injury should be examined in a business con-
text. The issue of allocating the risks of loss commonly arises whenever
two parties contract, especially where one party can be characterized as
being in an inferior bargaining position. In the business setting, the cost
of injuries is most often placed on the producer because courts believe
that the cost of the product should include the cost of injuries resulting in
its production. 30 Additionally, the party best able to bear the cost
should carry the greater burden of liability. The university seems to be in
125. CaL Senate Select Comm. on Licensed and Designated Sports Official Hearing Tran-
scripts, Oct. 21, 1985, 17-18 [hereinafter Transcripts] (statement of David Meggyesy, Western
Director of the National Football League Player's Association).
126. Id
127. Id
128. Thomas S. Mulligan, It Takes Deep Pockets to Play in This Risky Insurance Game,
L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1991, at D1.
129. Transcripts, supra note 125, at 17-18.
130. KEETON et al., supra note 1, at 573.
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the best position to bear the cost, in light of the student's inexperience
and youth, the unavoidable nature of many types of injuries, and the
university's superior experience, bargaining position, and ability to pass
along the costs to the fans as the "consumers." The extent of that liabil-
ity should be determined by considering the potential for extended disa-
bility or even death caused by the injury.
A. College Sports Are Big Business
The marketing of college athletics has become a profitable business
in the United States. 3 ' Contrary to what many educators may suggest,
successful college programs are pursued as more than a source of prestige
for a university or as part of an overall educational program. 32 Today,
college sports can be viewed as an expensive, though potentially lucra-
tive, source of income for major universities.'3 3 In 1991, thirty-eight col-
lege football teams divided a pool of $64 million for participating in post-
season bowl games.13 4 While the payoff for participating in some bowl
games is better than others, all bowl games are profitable ventures for the
participant universities. 3 For example, the Orange Bowl paid $4.2 mil-
lion each to the University of Colorado and Notre Dame University
teams for playing on January 1, 199 1. 136 Before a bowl game will even be
sanctioned by the NCAA, the organizers of the bowl must guarantee
each participating team a minimum payout of $600,000.' 31 In 1993, that
minimum will rise to $750,000.138 In addition to college football, college
basketball also earns lucrative payoffs for the schools. As a result of tele-
vision contracts with Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. ("CBS")
worth more than $1.1 billion over ten years, the participants in the
NCAA championship basketball tournaments will divide over $100 mil-
lion annually.
139
The product being sold by the universities is "amateur" athletics, as
distinguished from professional athletics."4 The main component is the
131. Goldman, supra note 3, at 206.
132. Id
133. Transcripts, supra note 125, app. at 1 (statement by Joseph B. Montoya, senate com-
mittee chairman).
134. Mike Penner, There's Not Enough Payofffor a Playoff, L.A. TiMEs, Apr. 29, 1991, at
Cl.




139. Chuck Stogel, The 100 Most Powerful People in Sports, THE SPORTING NEWS, Jan. 7,
1991, at S2.
140. See Transcripts, supra note 124, app. at 1; Goldman, supra note 3, at 235-36.
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"student athlete" who, in many instances, receives a scholarship or other
grant-in-aid in exchange for participation on these teams. Some students
have even claimed that they received other forms of financial remunera-
tion in violation of the rules governing college sports.1 4 1 The current
situation involving college sports has led to what one law professor has
called the "All American Non-Sequitur": if a high school athlete is an
outstanding football or basketball player, then the player must go to col-
lege to continue his athletic training. 142 The player is forced to go to
college to develop his skills because, with a few exceptions, the NFL has
rules declaring high school athletes ineligible for the professional draft
until four years after graduation from high school. 43 The National Bas-
ketball Association ("NBA") had similar provisions in their bylaws until
141. As part of a point-shaving scandal surrounding Tulane University's basketball pro-
gram, star center John "Hot Rod" Williams told prosecutors he received $100 per week from
his coach, in addition to a $10,000 lump sum payment, to attend the university. Tulane Hit
Again-Harder; Three Players Are Indicted, CHi. TRIB., Apr. 6, 1985, at C3.
During the investigation, Kenneth Davis of Texas Christian University ("TCU") admit-
ted that he received cash, clothing and other goods worth a total of $38,000 while playing for
TCU. Tony Kornheiser, NCAA Spot-Checks Have Proved to be an Insignificant Bust, WASH.
PosT, Oct. 27, 1985, at C5.
During the 1980s, violations of NCAA rules were widespread. Fifty-seven percent of the
106 NCAA Division I-A football programs were punished in some way by the NCAA during
that period. The violations ranged from the subtle--providing the athlete with athletic shoes
or game tickets to be sold-to the more obvious-academic fraud or outright cash payments.
More disturbing was the finding in a recent study of Division I basketball players that sixty
percent of them believed that taking payments was not morally wrong. Goldman, supra note
3, at 207-08.
142. Transcripts, supra note 125, at 3-4 (statement of Ray Yasser, Professor, University of
Tulsa College of Law).
143. In spite of numerous attacks against the program, the NFL has maintained a system
designed to protect its "minor league" system. This is done by limiting the class of people who
are eligible to enter the annual draft:
No person shall be eligible to play or be selected as a player unless (1) all college
eligibility of such player has expired, or (2) at least five (5) years shall have elapsed
since the player first entered or attended a recognized junior college, college, or uni-
versity, or (3) such player receives a diploma from a recognized college or university
prior to September 1st of the next football season of the League.
N.F.L. CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS § 12.1(A) (1988). The NBA similarly defines the class
of persons eligible for its annual player draft:
The following classes of persons shall be eligible for the annual Draft:
(a) Students in four-year colleges whose classes are to be graduated during the June
of or following the holding of the Draft.
(b) Students in four-year colleges whose original classes have already been gradu-
ated, who indicate that they do not choose to exercise remaining collegiate basketball
eligibility, by renouncing such remaining eligibility ....
(c) Students in four-year colleges whose original classes have already been graduated
if such students have no remaining collegiate basketball eligibility.
(d) Persons who become eligible pursuant to the provisions of Section 2.05 of these
By-Laws.
NBA BY-LAws § 6.03 (1991).
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the rules were challenged as violating the antitrust laws." Although
more and more college athletes are taking advantage of the exceptions
and are leaving college early to take a shot at the professional ranks,
145
few actually have the skills to make a successful transition to the profes-
sional level without completing their college eligibility.1 " The anomaly
is that many athletes go to college solely for sports training, but in the
end they leave school without graduating either academically or
athletically.
With millions of dollars in tournament or bowl revenues and alumni
contributions at stake, some colleges have adopted a "win at all costs"
mentality that threatens educational standards. Because the colleges
have an interest in developing quality athletic programs that will gener-
ate profit, the blue-chip athletes are heavily recruited with minimal re-
gard for their academic skills or the NCAA rules." In many situations,
universities make exceptions and stretch the rules governing admission in
order to admit blue-chip athletes. This is done in ways the same univer-
sities would not stretch to admit marginal non-athlete students."8
Often, these athletes are not really "college material," meaning that they
are not prepared to perform academically in college, but universities tend
to accommodate them rather than to fail them. 149 One example of this
tendency is the situation involving Dexter Manley, former defensive end
for the Washington Redskins. Oklahoma State University admitted
Manley even though he was unable to read or write.' After playing
144. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
145. See generally, Inside Stuff, THE SPORTING NEWS, Feb. 4, 1991, at 23; Howard Balzer,
NFL Draft Spotlight Focuses on Underclassmen, THE SPORTING NEWS, Apr. 23, 1990, at 38;
Vito Stellino, Joe College: Look Before You Leap, THE SPORTING NEWS, Mar. 5, 1990, at 48.
146. Goldman argues that "professional sports are not an adequate substitute for college
athletics.. ." in sports like football and basketball. In addition to the professional leagues'
exclusionary rules, many athletes do not possess the talent to play at the professional level, at
least at the time that they enter college. Goldman, supra note 3, at 227-28.
147. But see Proposition 48, which took effect in 1986, defining minimum academic require-
ments that must be achieved before a recruited athlete could receive institutional aid. NCAA
OPERATING BYLAWS § 14.3.1 (1991-92). The consequences of failing to meet the minimum
academic standards were modified at the NCAA convention in 1990 by Proposition 26, which
allowed certain recruited athletes to receive institutional aid based on need. NCAA OPERAT-
ING BYLAWS § 14.3.2 (1991-92). Effective in 1995, the minimum academic standards will be
raised to make it more difficult for marginal students to receive athletic scholarships. Ed Sher-
man, NCAA 's New Standards Best for the Brightest, THE SPORTING NEWS, Jan. 27, 1992, at
55.
148. "The commercialization of sport and its concomitant emphasis on winning has un-
questionably denigrated the educational component of student-athletes' college experience."
Goldman, supra note 3, at 241-42.
149. See id. at 242.
150. Tom Friend, Manley to Testify on Illiteracy, WASH. POST, May 18, 1989, at BI; Red-
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professional football for a few years, Manley went back to elementary
school where it was determined that he could only read at a second-grade
level. 5 ' Another example involves Kevin Ross. Ross left Creighton
University, where he was attending on a basketball scholarship, to enroll
at a Chicago elementary school because he could not read. 15 2 Chris
Washburn was admitted to North Carolina State University after he
achieved a total score of only 470 on the Scholastic Aptitude Test
("SAT"). 5 3 At that time, the average SAT score of an entering fresh-
man at North Carolina State was 1,030.154 Billy Don Jackson, admitted
to UCLA without taking any standard admissions test, was later called a
"functional illiterate" by a judge who sentenced Jackson to jail for volun-
tary manslaughter.'
55
As a response to the growing number of incidents involving illiterate
college athletes, the NCAA adopted "Proposition 48." Since Proposition
48 took effect in 1986, universities have suggested that admission of illit-
erate athletes is unlikely to continue.' 56 Under Proposition 48, the
NCAA declares as ineligible any athlete who scores less than 700 on the
SAT or fifteen on the American College Test ("ACT"), or who has a
minimum high school grade point average of less than 2.0 on a 4.0
scale.5'" These regulations, however, do not prohibit the athlete from
being admitted into the university. There are only minimal penalties for
admission of athletes who fail to meet the minimum standards; the ath-
letes are ineligibile to participate in athletics during their freshman year
or to receive athletic scholarship money in the first year. 158
In 1990, the University of Louisville recruited perhaps the most ath-
letically talented freshman class in the nation, but three of the five re-
skins' Manley Tells Senators of Graduating Despite Illiteracy, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 1989, at
C8; Bruce Newman, Classroom Coaches; AcademicAdvisers Are in the Team Picture, SoRTs
ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 19, 1990, at 62.
151. Redskins' Manley Tells Senators of Graduating Despite Illiteracy, supra note 148.
152. Newman, supra note 148; see also Edmund J. Sherman, Note, Good Sports, Bad Sports:
The District Court Abandons College Athletes in Ross v. Creighton University, 11 Loy. L.A.
ENT. LJ. 657 (1991).
153. David G. Savage, Key Vote Due; NCAA Rules Could Clear the Bench, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 1986, Part 1, at 1.
154. Id
155. I.d; Thomas Bonk, UCLA Racks up the Titles, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1988, C3; Sports
People, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 18, 1983, at A23.
156. Athletes Can't Stay Illiterate Now, Educator Says, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1989, Part 3, at
4.
157. NCAA OPERATING BYLAws § 14.3.1.1 (1991-92). The eligibility standards under this
section, however, will be raised in 1995 following approval of the increase at the 1992 NCAA
Convention. Sherman, supra note 147.
158. NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS, supra note 157.
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cruits could not meet the minimum standards of Proposition 48.59 At
the Nike basketball camp for top high school players, thirty of the 120
athletes could read at no better than a sixth-grade level, six of them at
only a third-grade level. 1" It is from this group of athletes that some of
the most highly recruited freshman entering college are chosen. As uni-
versities claim that graduation rates of their athletes have increased to
levels comparable with those of the general student population, it is un-
clear how much of the increase may be due to special programs instituted
to help athletes perform academically. In 1989, for example, the Univer-
sity of Southern California ("USC") spent over $60,000 on a special
tutoring program for athletes. 161 In 1990, Auburn University spent
$65,000 on tutors, and the University of California at Los Angeles
("UCLA") expected to spend $175,000 in 1991.162 In spite of the appar-
ent renewed concern for athletes, all of the talk may just be hot air. In
response to the growing concern for academics in college sports, Iowa
State University coach Jim Walden remarked, "All of a sudden, the
world has gotten down to graduation rates. As long as the world is going
to be run by academic bleeding hearts, I guess it's going to have to be
that way."9
1 63
The skimming of academic standards results in a university paying
scholarship money to an athlete, who is not on par with the player's non-
athletic peers, on the condition that he or she will play sports for the
university. Even when the athlete is prepared academically to enter col-
lege, however, the athlete may still enter college "motivated by a desire
to reap the rewards of a professional career."' " In this situation, the
athlete may view college "as a showcase for professional scouts.1 1 65 In
spite of a significant amount of evidence that few athletes view college
sports "as an opportunity to play for the fun of the game," 1 66 we are still
"wedded to this notion that our college athletes, football players and bas-
ketball players, particularly at big-time programs, are amateurs. 1 67 In
maintaining that erroneous belief, we refuse to accept the reality that
159. Newman, supra note 150.
160. Id
161. Phil Taylor & Shelley Smith, Exploitation or Opportunity? USC Debates Whether It's
Committed to Helping Black Athletes Academically, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 12, 1991, at
46.
162. Id
163. Jeff Shain, Criticism of Standards Misdirected, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Oct. 7, 1991,
newswire.
164. Goldman, supra note 3, at 234.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Transcripts, supra note 125, at 3-4.
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student athletes are in fact professionals who generate large amounts of
revenue for their schools. 168
B. Analysis of the Current Exclusionary Approaches
The judicial approaches that exclude student athletes from worker's
compensation protection seem to be result-oriented, adhering to the be-
lief that college athletes are amateurs. 69 But the modem reality of col-
lege sports is that the "amateur" characteristics of these athletes are far
from the "olympic" ideal. 17o In other words, few college athletes partici-
pate simply for the love of the game and the excitement of the competi-
tion. Rather, they play for some kind of financial consideration or in the
hope of making it to the "big leagues." '171 While it is clearly within the
prerogative of state legislatures to expressly exclude student athletes
from protection under the worker's compensation system, the public pol-
icy of every state should recognize a governmental interest in protecting
these athletes. College athletes fall within the class of individuals who
are protected by the worker's compensation system. Therefore, college
athletes should be entitled to receive the same protections as the more
traditional employees for the same reasons that the worker's compensa-
tion system was adopted in the first place. 1
72
1. Rensing v. Indiana State University Board of Trustees
The Rensing opinion, in which the Indiana Supreme Court denied
the existence of an employment contract, has several flaws that render
suspect its approach to the issue of whether student athletes are employ-
ees of their university for worker's compensation purposes. At least
three law review articles have taken exception to the Indiana Supreme
Court's approach to the issue. 173 It appears that the opinion was simply
168. Goldman, supra note 3, at 234. One Washington magazine estimated that basketball
star Patrick Ewing generated $12 million in additional income for Georgetown University
during his four years there. Savage, supra note 153.
169. See Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.F.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983);
Coleman v. Western Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
170. It should be noted at this point that the Olympics do not even adhere to the olympic
ideal of amateurism anymore. The International Olympic Committee now allows paid profes-
sional athletes to compete in the Olympics in 1992. This is one example of the difficulty that is
inherent in any effort to define who is an amateur. For a good discussion of this difficulty, see
WESTART & LoWELL, supra note 75, at 9-10.
171. See Transcripts, supra note 125 at 3.
172. See supra notes 7-32 and accompanying text.
173. Yasser, supra note 29; Robert C. Rafferty, Note, The Status of the College Scholarship
Athlete-Employee or Student?, 13 CAr. U. L. REv. 87 (1983); Mark W. Whitmore, Note,
Denying Scholarship Athletes Worker's Compensation: Do Courts Punt Away a Statutory Right?,
76 IowA L. RIv. 763 (1991).
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an effort to avoid dealing with a host of additional, and perhaps undesir-
able, results that may flow from a finding that a student athlete is an
employee of his university.
The court in Rensing gave great weight to the NCAA rules in deter-
mining whether the parties had entered into an employment contract.
The court attempted to determine the NCAA position on the relevant
issues by looking at the NCAA Constitution and Bylaws, 174 but clearly
misinterpreted those rules in reaching its result. As a starting point, the
court noted that "[a] fundamental policy of the NCAA... is that inter-
collegiate sports are viewed as part of the educational system and are
clearly distinguished from professional sports business."' 17  While this
states the traditional thinking regarding the status of college sports, it
fails to recognize the modem realities of major college athletics. Major
college sports today are lucrative business ventures, and most college ath-
letes view participation as a stepping stone to the professional levels.1
76
The court also noted that the NCAA has "strict rules against 'taking
pay' for sports."1 "7 At the same time, however, the NCAA distinguishes
scholarships and grants-in-aid, which are acceptable, from compensation
that exceeds certain limits established by the NCAA. 7 1 The approved
limits generally include compensation in amounts not to exceed tuition,
books, and boarding expenses.17 9 This compensation clearly falls within
the type of non-traditional remuneration considered to be pay in Van
Horn.'mo Additionally, the court asserted that universities are prohibited
from making a scholarship award conditional, in any way, upon the ath-
lete's physical ability.'"' That assertion not only mischaracterizes the
common practice in every university athletic department but also reflects
the court's clear misinterpretation of the express language of the NCAA
Operating Bylaws.'" 2 Apparently, the court based its finding on the
NCAA prohibition against decreasing the amount of financial assistance
"during the period of the award.., on the basis of the student athlete's
174. Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1173.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 130-66 and accompanying text.
177. Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1173.
178. NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS § 15.01.1-.2 (1991-92).
179. NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS § 15.2 (1991-92).
180. Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172 (1963).
181. Rensing 444 N.E.2d at 1173.
182. The NCAA approves of a conditioned scholarship grant where it is appropriately lim-
ited in the length of the term: "Where a student athlete's ability is taken into consideration in
any degree in awarding unearned financial aid, such aid shall not be awarded for a period in
excess of one year." NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS § 15.3.3.1 (1991-92).
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ability or his contribution to the team."18 3 At the end of the one-year
grant period, however, the NCAA expressly allows the university to re-
duce, or even to cancel, the athlete's scholarship for any reason.
18 4
Next, the Rensing court analyzed the intent of the parties and deter-
mined that "the financial aid which [the student] Rensing received was
not considered by the parties involved to be pay or income." ' Presum-
ably, the court found this to be relevant to the question of whether the
parties intended to enter into an employer-employee relationship. The
court's logic on this issue is curious. First, the court states that Rensing
could not have considered the scholarship to be pay because he did not
report it as income to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"). I6 Then, in
the next sentence, the court concedes that Rensing was under no duty to
report it as income because the IRS does not tax scholarship proceeds.18 7
It is unclear how Rensing's failure to report those proceeds could give
rise to any inference of intention if he was under no duty to report his
scholarship income to the IRS.
Additionally, the Rensing court suggested that the university could
not have intended to enter into an employment relationship because it
did not consider the scholarship to be pay. In effect, the court's opinion
can be characterized as holding that "the NCAA defines an amateur as
someone who does not receive more than the NCAA members agree to
pay them... and if they are paid more, they are no longer amateur."1881
The court determined that neither the university nor the NCAA consid-
ered the scholarship to be pay because the university's membership status
in the NCAA was not affected by the grant of the scholarship. 8 9 The
court reached this erroneous construction of the NCAA rules by substi-
tuting the NCAA's definition of "pay" for the legislature's formulation
for determining the proper form of remuneration for services under the
worker's compensation system. Although student athletes may not re-
ceive compensation at a level equal to their fair market value, they are
still "paid" in exchange for their services. 190 Here, the parties entered a
"textbook quid pro quo"' arrangement" in which it was agreed that the
183. NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS § 3-4-(c)-(1) (1982-83) (this section is now incorporated
into the Operating Bylaws as § 15.3.4.2 (1991-92)).
184. NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS § 15.3.3-.5 (1991-92).
185. Rensing 444 N.E.2d at 1173.
186. Id
187. Id
188. Goldman, supra note 3, at 234.
189. Rensing 444 N.E.2d at 1173.
190. Goldman, supra note 3, at 234.
191. Quidpro quo: "What for what; something for something. Used in law for the giving
[of] one valuable thing for another. It is nothing more than the mutual consideration which
19921
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university would compensate the student for services rendered on the
football team. 192 It is likely that neither party gave much thought to the
type of relationship they were creating. A better approach for the court
would have been to examine the type of relationship that the contract
created. Analysis of the contract indicates that the parties "bargained
for an exchange in the manner of employer and employee." 
193
The court went on to find that the Indiana worker's compensation
act was not applicable to persons receiving scholarship benefits.
194
Rather, the system applied to students "who work for the university and
perform services not integrally connected with the institution's educa-
tional program and for which, if the student were not available, the Uni-
versity would have to hire outsiders."19  In the modem reality of major
college athletics, however, a football field may be the furthest thing from
the classroom. Since graduation rates for athletes remain at relatively
low levels, 196 the business of college sports takes on greater significance
as education becomes more peripheral. Arguably, college athletes have
become increasingly distanced from the school's educational program.
The court's distinction could lead to the anomalous result in which a
salaried student equipment manager who is injured on the sidelines in a
collision with a charging fullback is covered by worker's compensation,
but the fullback injured in the same collision is left unprotected.
Last, the court agreed with Judge Young in his dissent from the
appellate court decision. Judge Young had opined that Rensing was not
"in the service of" the trustees of the university.1 97 In a conclusory
statement, the supreme court agreed that the university may have bene-
fited from Rensing's participation on the football team in a general way,
but concluded nevertheless that the benefit was insufficient to find
passes between the parties to a contract, and which renders it valid and binding." BLACK'S
LAW DICTONARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990).
192. Rafferty, supra note 173, at 100 (emphasis in original).
193. Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 437 N.E.2d 78, 86 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982), rev'd 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983).
194. Rensin& 444 N.E.2d at 1174.
195. Id.
196. A recent NCAA study revealed that only 26.6% of black athletes graduated within
five years of entering college. The same study found that only 52.3% of white athletes gradu-
ated in the same time. Taylor & Smith, supra note 161, at 46.
The chairperson of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Energy and
Commerce, subcommittee on commerce, suggested that with the "zillions of dollars" earned
by college sports, universities should spend more money to better assist recruits with poor
educational backgrounds in order to improve graduation rates. Don Shannon, Coaches Ask
Congress to Keep Hands OffNCAA, L.A. TIMEs, July 26, 1991, at C2.
197. Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1174 (quoting Rensing 437 N.E.2d at 90 (Young, J.,
dissenting)).
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Rensing in the service of the university. 98 This conclusion "flies in the
face of the plain meaning of those words,"'1 99 and suggests that the court
was stretching to justify a position that lacked adequate support. By par-
ticipating on the football team, Rensing was under the "control" of the
coaches, who represented the university in their positions as coaches.
This type of control can be extensive where the athlete spends more time
on the football field than in the classroom during much of the year.2'
By directing the athlete in his activities on the team, the university re-
ceives the benefit of his participation. It was the school's control, com-
bined with the benefit derived from the control, that placed Rensing in
the service of Indiana State University.2"'
2. Coleman v. Western Michigan University
The Coleman court cited the Rensing decision with approval and
reached the same result, but used the simpler "economic reality" ap-
proach.20 2 In Coleman, the Michigan court supported the proposition
that "an athlete receiving financial aid is still first and foremost a stu-
dent."2 ' 3 Concededly, one of the reasons that an athlete attends a uni-
versity, in many cases, is to obtain an education. In spite of what
university administrators would like to believe, however, many athletes
enroll at a university simply for the opportunity to play "minor league"
sports.20 4 Even students who attend the university "first and foremost"
to get an education often have a job outside of the classroom. There is no
reason why the scholarship athlete cannot be a student primarily and be
employed by the university secondarily. Additionally, the Coleman
court held that the scholarship athlete was not "in the service of" the
university.20 5 As in Rensing, the athlete was under the extensive control
198. Id
199. Yasser, supra note 29, at 77.
200. Transcripts, supra note 125, app. at 2.
201. See Laeng v. W.C.A.B., 494 P.2d 1, 8-9 (Cal. 1972).
202. Coleman v. Western Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
203. Ide (quoting Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170, 1173
(Ind. 1983)).
204. Commenting on the proposition that the student athlete is "first and foremost" a stu-
dent, the late Bear Bryant said:
I used to go along with the idea that football players on scholarship were "student-
athletes," which is what the NCAA calls them. Meaning a student first and an ath-
lete second. We are kidding ourselves, trying to make it more palatable to the acade-
micians. We don't have to say that and we shouldn't. At the level we play, the boy is
really an athlete first and a student second.
Goldman, supra note 3, at 242 (quoting J. MICHENER, SPORTS IN AMERICA 254 (1976)).
205. Coleman, 336 N.W.2d at 228 (quoting Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1174).
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of the coaches for the benefit of the university.' The control the univer-
sity exerts over the life of an athlete should be sufficient to find the athlete
"in the service of" the university.
Under the first factor of Michigan's "economic reality" test,20 7 the
Coleman court underestimated the amount of control that a university
exerts over an athlete. During the athletic season, athletes are likely to
spend more time preparing for their sport than studying or attending
class.2 °0 In order to maintain the eligibility of their athletes under the
NCAA rules, many schools direct their athletes toward less demanding,
"gut" courses.' 9 If the athlete fails to participate in the sport to the
extent demanded by the coaches, he risks losing his place on the team.
The university's control has several effects. It directly impacts the ath-
lete's ability to retain his scholarship, so that he may not be able to afford
to attend the university should he fail to comply with the coaches' de-
mands. It also affects the athlete's ability to develop his skills as an ath-
lete and to gain the exposure necessary to make the jump to the
professional level. Because the coach controls the roster and the purse
strings in many cases, the coach also controls the college life of the
athlete.
Regarding the second factor of the economic reality test, the court
concluded that the university's ability to discipline the athlete was lim-
ited because the school could not revoke, or even decrease the amount of,
the scholarship for one year once the award is made.210 A university
may discipline an athlete, however, by removing him from the active ros-
ter or by taking away other privileges, such as access to athletic tutors or
priority registration for classes, that accompany the student's status as an
athlete. In the business world, a one-year guaranteed contract is not un-
common. Since the scholarship is irrevocable for only one year, the uni-
versity's ability to discipline the athlete is only minimally limited.
Additionally, while the economic reality test identifies the right to disci-
pline the employee as a relevant factor, it does not require that an em-
206. In order to develop and maintain a winning program, which is a prerequisite to a large
salary and job security, coaches often demand long hours of practice at the expense of study
time. To maintain the eligibility of athletes, these same coaches often overlook, or even en-
courage, academic fraud. To say that the university does not control the total life of the ath-
lete is to express a completely naive understanding of major college athletics. Goldman, supra
note 3, at 242.
207. Coleman, 336 N.W.2d at 225-26.
208. Goldman, supra note 3, at 242, 257.
209. IM. at 256-57.
210. Coleman, 336 N.W.2d at 226; see also NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS § 15.3.4.2 (1991-
92); but see NCAA OPERATING BYLAWS § 15.3.4.1 (1991-92).
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ployer have the unfettered ability to discipline his employees.2 11
The Coleman court conceded that the scholarship constituted
"wages" within the meaning of Michigan worker's compensation laws
under the third prong of the test. Thus, the only factor the court identi-
fied as clearly militating against a finding that no employment relation-
ship existed was whether the task performed by the athlete was integral
to the university's business.2 12 The court's dependence on this single fac-
tor contradicts the admonition included in the economic reality test that
no "factor[ ] is by itself dispositive." '213 Also, the court's finding that the
athlete was not "an integral part of" the university's business ignores the
reality of major college sports. As one court found, "[I]t is cavil214 to
suggest that college football... is not a business. ' 2 15 Another commen-
tator concluded, "College sports is big business and the recruitment and
hiring of college athletes is an integral part of that business.12 1 6 There-
fore, each factor of the economic reality test taken in turn and considered
together leads to a finding that an employment relationship existed.
3. Statutory Exclusion of Athletes from Coverage
The student athlete who is expressly excluded by statute from the
definition of employee for worker's compensation purposes is left with
few options. If the athlete is uninsured, he or she will be forced to pursue
tort remedies or to depend on the goodwill of the university.21 7 A tort
remedy is unlikely to be available in states like California and New York
because the athlete will probably be required to show reckless or inten-
tional conduct as the cause of his injuries.218 In those states, athletic
211. See Coleman, 336 N.W.2d at 225-26.
212. Id. at 226-27.
213. Id at 226.
214. "mo raise trivial and frivolous objection." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 218 (9th ed. 1990).
215. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd 707
F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
216. Goldman, supra note 3, at 217; see generally id at 241-42, 257.
217. Currently, many universities already voluntarily provide some level of medical insur-
ance, and often even extend disability coverage. Universities, however, are not required to
provide these types of coverage to any athlete. See, e.g., Hearing on LB 765 Before the Ne-
braska Legislative Committee on Business and Labor, Jan. 25, 1984 at 19-20, 22 [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Dick Wood, general counsel for the University of Nebraska).
218. See Ordway v. Super. Ct., 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1988); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964
(N.Y. 1986). But see Segoviano v. Housing Authority, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1983). The Califor-
nia Supreme Court has granted review of the continuing viability of reasonable implied as-
sumption of the risk, and this decision is still pending. Bay Development, Ltd. v. Super. Ct.,
269 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1990); see generally, Daniel E. Lazaroff, Torts & Sports: Participant Liabil-
ity to Co-Participants for Injuries Sustained During Competition, 7 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS
L. REv. 191 (1990).
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participants impliedly assume the reasonable risks inherent in the game
being played.2 19 Those risks include the possibility of injury caused by
the simple negligence of other participants.2 20 In other states, proof of
negligence may still pose a significant barrier to recovery of damages. As
a result, the athlete will be under-compensated or uncompensated for his
injuries in many, if not most, situations.
States must recognize the seriousness of the situation facing the col-
lege athlete and take steps to place the burden of compensating the ath-
lete for injuries on the party best able to bear the cost-the university.
One state senator suggested that "of grave concern is the injury rate and
the lack of compensation or insufficient medical insurance provided by
the university to the athlete."2 2 The universities, as the parties who get
the most direct benefit from the participation of the athletes, should bear
some of the cost for any injuries that befall the athletes.2 2 2 Even the
general counsel for the University of Nebraska conceded that "there
needs to be protection provided to athletes participating ... not only for
football, but for all sports and it should be at institutional expense
",223
C. Approaches to Allocating the Risks of Injury
Up to this point, this comment has suggested that student athletes
who receive scholarships or other grants-in-aid from universities in ex-
change for their participation on the school athletic teams should be con-
sidered as "employees" of the universities. While most of the cases cited
here discuss the California approach, which is more progressive than
other systems, the general concept of placing the risks inherent in the
operation of a business on the party best able to bear those risks is com-
mon to all jurisdictions.2 2 4 Placing the risk of injury on the athlete is
simply unfair where it is shown that the athletes are otherwise exploited
for the benefit of the universities' financial success. 225 These athletes
come within the broad definition of employee for most worker's compen-
219. Ordway, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536; Turcotte, 502 N.E.2d 964.
220. Ordway, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536; Turcotte, 502 N.E.2d 964.
221. Transcripts, supra note 125, at i.
222. Hearings supra note 217, at 10 (statement of Ernest Chambers, Nebraska state
senator).
223. Id. at 20 (statement of Dick Wood, general counsel for the University of Nebraska).
224. See generally KEETON et al., supra note 1.
225. "Amateur athletics is a multi-million dollar industry in which its primary workers do
not share in its rewards. Student-athletes are exploited by schools that defend their regulations
as preventing the commercialization of college sports. Major college sports, however, have
long been commercialized." Goldman, supra note 3, at 260.
In support of that proposition, Goldman notes that the football program at the University
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sation laws, and it is appropriate that they receive the benefits of this
status. Most importantly, the athlete becomes eligible for compensation
for injuries sustained in the course of his participation on a team.
This is not to say, however, that the worker's compensation system
is the only appropriate method for insuring the health of student athletes.
Another solution currently being pursued involves requiring universities
to obtain mandatory insurance for the athletes, with coverage similar to
that under the worker's compensation system.226
1. Coverage Within the Worker's Compensation System
Protecting the injured student athlete through the state worker's
compensation system is an appropriate and workable option. The system
is designed to handle all types of injury claims as well as the large volume
of claims by student athletes that may follow once this approach is
adopted. Still, this approach is not without its weaknesses as far as the
athlete is concerned. First, the athlete will be required to show the exist-
ence of an exchange between the parties that created the employment
relationship." The non-scholarship athletes likely will be required to
self-insure, absent some other agreement of exchange. Second, the ath-
lete will have to give up his right to pursue a common law remedy, in
exchange for the certain recovery that is provided by the system." 8 In
other words, the athlete will be unable to receive compensation for inju-
ries like pain and suffering, and the total recovery will be limited to the
statutorily determined levels. 9
In 1984, Nebraska State Senator Ernest Chambers proposed legisla-
tion that would have brought all college athletes within the protection of
the worker's compensation system.230 Recognizing that sports at the
University of Nebraska generates large amounts of revenue for the
school, Senator Chambers believed such a system was necessary to "pro-
vide some certitude about what will happen to [the athletes] if they be-
of Nebraska generated approximately $11 million in revenues in 1987, but it paid out only
S150,000 to the football players in the form of scholarships. Id. at 257.
226. See NED. Rnv. STAT. § 85-106.05 (1989).
227. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
230. "The term employee... shall be construed to mean... [e]very person who prepares as
an athlete for or participates as an athlete in any intercollegiate athletic event conducted by,
with, or through any postsecondary educational institution in this state which receives tax
revenue." NEB. L.B. 765, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. (1984) (This bill was removed from considera-
tion of the full legislature at the request of its author, Senator Ernest Chambers, because sub-
stitute legislation was incorporated into Neb. L.B. 764, from the same session, and was
subsequently approved by the full legislature on April 9, 1984.).
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come injured.",231  Recognizing the inequities of its current system,
California proposed similar legislation in 1986 that would have changed
the existing exclusions and included scholarship athletes within the defi-
nition of employee for worker's compensation purposes only.232 Addi-
tionally, in recognition of the potential returns to a university from
participation in college athletics, California State Senator Joseph Mon-
toya noted that "increasing numbers of these young men and women are
being left out to fend for themselves if they no longer have their athletic
prowess as a consequence of some injury." 3  Neither piece of legislation
was ultimately approved, although the Nebraska State Legislature passed
a compromise bill which instituted a mandatory insurance program.
234
The protection of all college athletes under worker's compensation,
regardless of whether they are receiving scholarship aid or not, may be
desirable for various reasons. First, all college athletes are in the same
situation following an injury, regardless of whether they are on scholar-
ship or not. Second, the benefits to the university from the non-scholar-
ship, or walk-on, athlete's participation are the same as, or even greater
than, the scholarship athlete's participation, where the participation of a
large number of athletes is necessary to field a competitive team. In the
case of a walk-on athlete, the bargain to the university is better because
the university does not pay a scholarship to procure the athlete's services.
While the walk-on athlete's services may be characterized as gratuitous,
the benefit to the university may create an obligation for the university to
provide some protection against injuries. Once we accept the premise
that major college sports are big business and that universities are in the
business of promoting amateur athletics in addition to providing educa-
tion, it is not unfair to impose on the university the minimal obligation of
insuring all of its athletes.235
231. Hearings, supra note 217, at 10.
232. The California Senate considered the following modification to its list of persons ex-
cluded from the definition of "employee" for worker's compensation purposes:
(a) "Employee" includes any person who is a student enrolled at any public or pri-
vate 4-year college or university and who competes in college or university sponsored
athletics in connection with the receipt of an athletic scholarship....
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to make the student an employee for
any purposes other than this division. Nothing in this provision shall be construed to
make the student a professional athlete.
CAL. S.B. 1760, Feb. 10, 1986 (This bill was removed from consideration by the committee at
the request of its author, Senator Joseph B. Montoya, without any recommendation from the
committee.).
233. Transcripts, supra note 125, at 2.
234. See infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
235. See generally Barragan v. W.C.A.B., 240 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1987); Gabel v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 256 P. 564 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
SPORTS LAW
In any event, universities should recognize the benefits flowing from
their participation in the worker's compensation system. Universities
face huge potential liability in the event that an athlete, or his estate, is
able to recover on a tort claim arising out of his participation on a sports
team. When Nebraska was considering the inclusion of student athletes
within its worker's compensation program in 1984, it estimated that the
University of Nebraska would incur a total annual cost of only $55,000
in order to participate in the system.236 The cost to state colleges was
estimated to be even less, at only $15,000.237 Given the potential for
large negative jury awards, 238 it seems that a prudent university would do
all that it could to avoid tort liability to a player like Rensing.
2 39
Through participation in the worker's compensation system, a univer-
sity's liability could be significantly limited.
2. Coverage Through Independent Insurance
Recognizing the problem of significant medical and career costs fac-
ing injured college athletes, the lawmakers and the University of Ne-
braska compromised. Instead of adopting Senator Chambers' worker's
compensation proposal, they settled on a mandatory insurance program
under which universities within the state were required to obtain cover-
age for all of their athletes.2 0 The approach that was finally approved by
the state legislature included both medical care as well as limited disabil-
ity coverage for the injured athlete.241 This compromise resulted from
the university's expressed fear that the NCAA would not approve any
program that implied an employer-employee relationship. 242 Both par-
ties conceded, however, that the NCAA's position on the issue was un-
clear.243 But did the NCAA's position really matter? Should the NCAA
be able to define the direction of public policy? It seems that the
236. Hearings, supra note 217, at 10 (statement of Chambers).
237. Id
238. See generally, Edith Greene et al., Jurors' Attitudes About Civil Litigation and the Size
of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U.L. REv. 805 (1991).
239. Rensing suffered a 95-100% disability as a result of his injuries which were incurred
during a spring punting drill. Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 437 N.E.2d 78,
80-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
240. "The Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska shall establish an insurance pro-
gram which provides coverage to student athletes for personal injuries or accidental death
while participating in university-organized play or practice in an intercollegiate athletic
event." NEB. REv. STAT. § 85-106.05 (1989).
The law described certain minimum coverage that provided for initial and extended medi-
cal care, permanent disability benefits, and payments for accidental death. Id
241. Id
242. Hearings, supra note 217, at 21, 25 (statements of Wood).
243. Id at 20-21.
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NCAA's interest in promoting "amateurism" ought to give way where a
significant need is identified by state legislators, and especially where the
definition of "amateur" is affected only marginally. 2'
The University of Nebraska favored the insurance approach simply
because it feared that any law that treated athletes as employees would
lead to the removal of the existing NCAA limitations on levels of com-
pensation payable to athletes in exchange for their participation. 245
While the issue of whether athletes should be paid fair market value for
their services is beyond the scope of this comment,2' it is relevant to
understanding the nature of the objections to the worker's compensation
approach. While football and basketball programs may generate signifi-
cant amounts of money for a university, most sports programs at the
universities result in a deficit.2 47 These money-generating programs help
pay for the operation of the schools.24 Universities fear, however, that
the profits to be earned from these programs will be significantly reduced
if the compensation limitations are lifted. 4 9 For this reason, universities
view anything that gives an athlete employee status for any purpose as
threatening to the profits of the universities. Additionally, any system
that requires the universities to provide protection to the athletes will
necessarily involve extra costs. This should not present a real problem,
however, because most universities claim to be already providing the nec-
essary medical care or insurance.2 50 A legislative mandate that universi-
ties provide protection only makes mandatory what many are already
doing.
Finally, athletes may derive some advantages where a mandatory
insurance program is instituted. For example, such a program would not
preclude an athlete from recovering under a common law remedy, over
and above the benefits provided under a policy of insurance. Addition-
ally, the amounts recoverable for any specific injury may be more flexi-
ble, being subject to negotiation between the insurer and the athlete
rather than determined by fixed schedules as under a worker's compensa-
tion system. Nevertheless, the choice between the worker's compensa-
244. Goldman concludes that restrictions on payments to athletes are only "marginally ef-
fective" in protecting the academic side of college sports. 'The elimination of the NCAA's
amateurism rules and the acceptance of payments to athletes may actually further educational
objectives." Goldman, supra note 3, at 242, 244.
245. See generally Hearings supra note 217, at 19-21, 25.




250. Hearings, supra note 217, at 19-20.
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tion approach or the mandatory insurance approach is one best left to
legislators.
V. CONCLUSION
Both the worker's compensation approach and the mandatory insur-
ance approach are significant steps in the direction of solving the liability
problem. Both approaches provide some level of protection to the in-
jured athlete, and either approach may be acceptable. This is especially
true where the insurance program provides coverage equal to or better
than that given by the worker's compensation approach.
Under the current system, athletes are the primary component of
the business of college sports. In that capacity, they are exploited for the
benefit of the university, and presumably, for the rest of the student body.
In addition to solving the physical injury problems of college athletes,
legislators may be interested in eliminating the pretense that major col-
lege sports are simply part of the complete educational system. In that
case, the characterization of the relationship between the university and
the athlete as an employment relationship would make adoption of the
worker's compensation approach the logical choice.
In any event, the courts should recognize the existence of an em-
ployment relationship whenever reliable evidence establishes that a stu-
dent athlete has agreed to exchange his services as an athlete for a
scholarship or other valuable consideration.251 One commentator who
argued that college athletes should be treated as professionals concluded,
"Courts willing to honestly appraise the present relationships in Ameri-
can 'amateur' sports must conclude that our big time college scholarship
athletes are really employees." '252 When courts and legislatures are will-
ing to make this concededly "uncomfortable and unsettling" decision,
they may find that many of the resulting effects are beneficial.253
The adoption of a student-as-employee definition may pose initial
problems, but these can be resolved. One potential problem is that this
definition may raise new tax considerations.25 4 A principled approach to
scholarships may require a finding by the IRS that such proceeds are
income to the athletes.255 Such an interpretation, however, could now be
251. See generally Van Horn v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1963);
University of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953).
252. Yasser, supra note 29, at 78.
253. Id at 77; see also supra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
254. See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 75, at 15-19.
255. See Rafferty, supra note 173, at 102.
1992]
474 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12
imposed upon scholarship proceeds by the IRS without a change in the
worker's compensation laws.
A second potential drawback is that, after obtaining employee sta-
tus, college athletes may seek to organize in labor unions.2" 6 The athletes
may collectively bargain for higher minimum salaries or other benefits,
like group health or dental plans. But it is difficult to understand how
these developments could be considered negatives, especially when Con-
gress has given special status to unions.257 While collective bargaining
may lead to higher costs for universities, economics should ensure that
the compensation to the athletes will not exceed their market value to the
universities. Additionally, because each college game provides an oppor-
tunity to become known and to be seen by professional scouts, it does not
seem likely that players will threaten to strike before the "big game"
simply to force some concession from the university.
Concededly, any program that gives athletes the protection they
need would likely require large amounts of administrative paperwork to
implement. The handling of a large number of claims as well as the rou-
tine work involved in monitoring the eligibility of participants would
generate additional costs. However, this would result from any proposed
program. The alternative would be to maintain the status quo and to
continue to leave athletes in the precarious situation in which they now
find themselves. The status quo is simply unacceptable.
A third disadvantage to finding that students who receive athletic
scholarships are employees of their university is that, eventually, students
receiving academic scholarships may also be considered employees of the
university. While the risk of injury in the chemistry lab may be lower
than on the football field, a lab accident that causes injury may be just as
damaging as one caused on the sports field. This raises the question of
whether these students really generate the same financial benefit to a uni-
versity as college athletes. In many situations, the answer may be "Yes,"
and including these students under any protective scheme may be consis-
tent with the discussion above. Detailed analysis of this topic, however,
is beyond the scope of this comment.
The need for protection of the student athlete is real. It takes no
stretch of the imagination to characterize these athletes as employees of
their schools. Because the worker's compensation system already exists
and can provide the necessary protections, this system should be utilized
as the most logical mechanism. However, an insurance system that pro-
256. Id.
257. See generally Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-67,
171-83, 185-87, 557 (1988).
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vides coverage at least as comprehensive as that provided by worker's
compensation laws may also be adequate to accomplish the goal of pro-
tecting athletes from the risk of injury.
The state legislatures and courts should make an honest appraisal of
the situation. In doing so, they should not succumb to the fear of un-
charted waters and allow the "continuation of an admittedly corrupt sys-
tem."25 In the current system, young athletes are exploited by the
university bosses and are subjected to great risk for little pay. Most col-
lege athletes are employees of their universities and should receive all of
the benefits that attach to such a status.
Keith A. Haskins*
258. Yasser, supra note 29, at 78.
* The author would like to dedicate this article to his wife, Kristen, and to his parents,
Travis and Maureen. Because of their love, support, and encouragement, he was able to sur-
vive law school. He would also like to thank Professor Daniel Lazaroff for his assistance.
1992]

